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I. INTRODUCTION
Today, by repealing the discriminatory Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell
policy, we also honor the service and sacrifice of all who
dedicate their lives to protecting the American people. We honor
the values of our nation and we close the door on a fundamental
unfairness.1

Throughout history, societies have relied on morality to establish
law. Morality is often considered the cornerstone of a civilized society,
and as such, it is fairly natural that throughout human experience, laws
have been based, either implicitly or explicitly, on moral judgments.
From Hammurabi’s Code to the Ten Commandments, mankind has
combined morality and reason to establish a rule of law with the purpose
of defining the outer limits of human behavior. Yet as we learn more
about the human condition, our understanding of reason and morality are
redefined. As our understanding grows, we, as a society, reinvent the
law to keep up with societal changes. The law, therefore, is a living
collection of humanity’s evolving understanding of itself.
There are various types of laws that use morality as a component,
and the Supreme Court has developed a long line of jurisprudence
creating a particularly useful taxonomy that will be adopted as the
analytical framework for this paper. As evidenced by morality-based
jurisprudence, there are four main types of morality-based legislation:
pure, composite, embedded, and inert.2 Pure moral rationale means that
there is no other means of justification than moral judgment, and the
moral judgment is explicit in the law.3 Composite morality justification
combines morality with another explicit aim such as public health or
welfare.4 An embedded morality justification is one in which there is an
1

156 CONG. REC. H3873–4024 (daily ed. May 27, 2010) (statement of Speaker
Pelosi).
2
Suzanne Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking Before and After
Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 1244 (2004).
3
Id.
4
Id. at 1245.
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explicit non-moral justification asserted, but the implicit justification is
morality.5 Finally, an inert moral rationale is a justification that relies on
the police power or other legitimate basis of government action to take a
moral position, but “does not actually rely on morality [for] its
analysis.”6
Since 1969, society has struggled with its evolving understanding
of homosexuality and morality.7 In 1986, the Supreme Court entered the
fray when it decided Bowers v. Hardwick.8 This case, concerning the
validity of a Georgia sodomy statute, gave the Supreme Court the
opportunity to add its reasoning to the understanding of homosexuality.
The Court decided that there was no right to homosexual sodomy
protected by the Constitution, and that the Georgia law was therefore
valid.9 Bowers was part of a national practice of discrimination against
homosexuals, which included a policy of discrimination against gays and
lesbians in the military, later modified by the statute commonly referred
to as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (DADT).10 Yet in 2003, Lawrence v.
Texas,11 a case concerning a Texas sodomy statute similar to the one at
issue in Bowers, not only overruled Bowers, but also held that consensual
sexual relations between two adults, even adults of the same sex, present
a liberty interest protected by the Constitution.12
Prior to Lawrence, DADT faced its fair share of failed
constitutional challenges,13 but Lawrence gave new credence to such
challenges.14 The problem with Lawrence is that it was elusive in its
5

Id.
Id. at 1246.
7
See generally DAVID CARTER, STONEWALL: THE RIOTS THAT SPARKED THE GAY
REVOLUTION (St. Martin’s Press, 1st ed. 2004). In 1969, at a bar known as the Stonewall
Inn in Greenwich Village, New York, NY, police conducted an early morning raid of one
of the most prominent hangouts for homosexuals in the city. Id. Instead of docilely
accepting their arrest in the face of these raids, the patrons of the Stonewall fought back
against the police and attracted a group that began to riot. Id. That group continued to
riot intermittently until it became a more organized effort to promote the idea that
homosexuals should be able to live openly without fear of being arrested. Id.
8
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
9
Id. at 190, 196.
10
10 U.S.C § 654 (2006).
11
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
12
Id. at 578.
13
See, e.g., Holmes v. California Army Nat’l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1135 (9th Cir.
1997) (holding that homosexuals were not a suspect class deserving heightened scrutiny,
and therefore applying rational basis review and finding DADT rational); Able v. United
States, 155 F.3d 628, 636 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that DADT did not violate Equal
Protection).
14
See, e.g., Hensala v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 343 F.3d 951, 956 (9th Cir. 2003)
(discharged soldier arguing that the military recoupment policy violates federal law after
Lawrence); Loomis v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 503 (2005) (discharged servicemember
6
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holding, which was most likely deliberate,15 and this vagueness has left
lower courts to struggle with its meaning, particularly the standard of
review.16 This uncertainty led numerous courts to attempt to extract the
meaning of Lawrence and the liberty interest or interests announced
therein.17 In addition, such confusion is particularly relevant to a
constitutional challenge to DADT where a court must determine how
Lawrence applies. Inherent in such a challenge is the amount of
deference the Court should grant Congress when it is exercising its
Article I power to raise and support armies.18
Considering these important questions, three circuit courts have
come to three very different results. The Eleventh Circuit, in Lofton v.
arguing that following Lawrence, his discharge was unconstitutional), appeal dismissed
voluntarily, 193 F. App’x 965 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Walker v. Barbour, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19855, *1–2 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 12, 2009) (“plaintiff argue[d] that the Mississippi
marriage statute; Defense of Marriage Act; . . . the Don’t Ask Don’t Tell Act; and barring
of a person convicted of felonies from military service are unconstitutional and violate[]
the 4th, 5th, 9th and 14th amendments [sic] . . . .”). See also Jeffrey S. Dietz, Getting
Beyond Sodomy: Lawrence and Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, 2 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV.
LIBERTIES 63 (2005); Pamela Glazner, Constitutional Doctrine Meets Reality: Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell in Light of Lawrence v. Texas, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 635 (2006).
15
See, e.g., Lawrence H. Tribe, The Fundamental Right That Dare Not Speak Its
Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893 (2004).
16
Tribe, supra note 15 (arguing that Lawrence announced a fundamental right, but
due to the politics of the court and the necessity to gain a majority, the court did not dare
call it fundamental). See also Witt v. Dep’t of Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 814–16 (9th Cir.
2008) (discussing the difficulty courts have had interpreting Lawrence and the standard
of review it requires); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence’s Jurisprudence of Tolerance:
Judicial Review to Lower the Stakes of Identity Politics, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1021 (2004);
Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 1399 (2004) (arguing that the privacy right announced in Lawrence does not follow
earlier reproduction rights cases, but rather announces a new liberty interest for sexual
intimacy for gay couples that is limited to private conduct); Nan D. Hunter, Living with
Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103 (2004) (arguing that Lawrence is heavy on the rhetoric
and light on clarity, Lawrence is capable of providing a holistic due process and equal
protection analysis to determine the cultural weight of the individual dignity involved);
Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431
(2005); Nelson Lund and John O. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris,
102 MICH. L. REV. 1555 (2004) (arguing that Lawrence is an example of judicial hubris;
the decision and its liberty interest will be extremely limited to near identical
circumstances); Marc Spindelman, Colloquium: The Boundaries of Liberty after
Lawrence v. Texas: Surviving Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1615 (2004); Cass
R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and
Marriage, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 27 (2003).
17
See, e.g., United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198, 203 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (noting that
other courts have grappled with standard of review required by Lawrence, whether it be
rational basis review, or strict scrutiny); United States v. Stirewalt, 60 M.J. 297 (C.A.A.F.
2004); United States v. Humphreys, 2005 CCA LEXIS 401 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Dec.
29, 2005); United States v. Smith, 66 M.J. 556 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 2008).
18
See Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 57–60 (1st Cir. 2008). But see Witt, 527 F.3d at
821.
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Secretary of the Department of Children and Family Services,19 a case
regarding adoption by homosexuals in Florida, did not apply a
heightened standard of review.20 The court found that the Supreme
Court identified no new fundamental right in Lawrence.21 The Ninth
Circuit, in Witt v. Department of the Air Force,22 a case of military
discharge under DADT, decided that Lawrence required some form of
heightened review.23 The court also found that Lawrence identified a
distinct liberty interest24 that should be weighed using a three-factor
balancing test.25 The balancing test announced in Witt has since become
the standard for heightened scrutiny post Lawrence.26 The Ninth Circuit
also stated that although deference should be given to Congress in
regulating the military, Congress is still subject to the limitations of due
process.27 Finally, in another military discharge case arising under
DADT, Cook v. Gates,28 the First Circuit held that Lawrence identified a
protected liberty interest and required a standard of review between
rational basis and strict scrutiny.29 The Gates court, however, relied
heavily on judicial deference to Congress to sustain the government’s
asserted interest under DADT.30
The resulting three-way split has left lower courts with an
assortment of case law interpreting Lawrence. Through close analysis of
the split as applied to DADT, it becomes apparent that Witt provides the
best framework following the Lawrence decision. Witt questions the
validity of morality-based legislation generally,31 which shows both a
closer reading of Lawrence and Justice Stevens’s dissent in Bowers, as
19

358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 817.
21
Id.
22
527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2008).
23
Id. at 816, 818. See also id. at 822 (Canby, J. dissenting) (noting that he would
have strict scrutiny apply to “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”).
24
Id. at 818.
25
Id. at 820 (adopting the three-factor test articulated by the Supreme Court in Sell v.
United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) as the proper test under intermediate scrutiny).
26
Witt, 527 F.3d at 819.
27
Id. at 821.
28
528 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008).
29
Id. at 56.
30
Id. at 60.
31
The court states in Lawrence that “Justice Stevens’s analysis, in [its] view, should
have been controlling in Bowers and should control here.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 578 (2003). In his dissent in Bowers, Justice Stevens stated that, “the fact that the
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is
not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice[,]” Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (indicating that morality
based justifications alone are an insufficient basis on which to uphold the law). See also
Goldberg, supra note 2, at 1243.
20
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well as a greater understanding of the higher value of social harmony
over legislated morality for morality’s sake.32 Despite the repeal of
DADT passed by the Senate,33 and signed by the President,34 the repeal
does not take effect until the President, Secretary of Defense, and Joint
Chiefs of Staff certify to Congress their acceptance and the Department
of Defense issues new regulations to enforce the nondiscrimination
policy.35 In this interim period, DADT is still in effect, and the analysis
herein is still applicable to challenges under DADT and challenges to
past applications of DADT that prevent a servicemember from
reenlisting in the armed forces.36
Part II of this Comment establishes the legal background necessary
to analyze the implications of Lawrence on “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” and
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) Article 125, Sodomy. This
section recounts the history of DADT, the law as it stood before
Lawrence, the Lawrence decision, and the resulting three-way split. Part
III analyzes the morality of DADT within the taxonomy of Supreme
Court jurisprudence and seeks to establish that DADT was no longer
constitutional after Lawrence, as demonstrated in Witt. In this section, I
argue that because the Court in Lawrence made Justice Stevens’s dissent
in Bowers controlling, morality alone is an insufficient basis on which to
legislate. Therefore, if DADT were based only on morality, it would no
longer survive even rational basis review.37 Alternatively, even if DADT
32
ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC
MORALITY, 1 (Clarendon Press, 1st ed. 1993). George introduces his work with the
following, “Laws cannot make men moral. Only men can do that; and they can do it only
by freely choosing to do the morally right thing for the right reason. Laws can command
outward conformity to moral rules, but cannot compel the internal acts of reason and will
which make an act of external conformity to the requirements of morality a moral act.”
Id. at 1. Though he goes on to defend the Pre-Liberal notion that legislating morality is
not unjust, he draws a line when such moral legislating undermines the harmony of
society. Id. at 90. “The values of interpersonal harmony and friendship helps to bring
into focus the moral requirement that the benefits and burdens of communal life
(including legal rights and duties) be distributed fairly and with due regard for the
particular needs and abilities of different persons.” Id.
33
Carl Hulse, Senate Repeals Ban Against Openly Gay Military Personnel, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 18, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/19/us/politics/19cong.html?_
r=1&scp=3&sq=don%27t%20ask&st=cse.
34
Aaron Gell, Obama Signs Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal, N.Y. OBSERVER, Dec. 22,
2010,
http://www.observer.com/2010/politics/obama-signs-dont-ask-dont-tell-repealwatch.
35
S. 4023, 111th Cong. § 2(b) (2010).
36
Id. at § 2(c). The bill, as passed by the Senate, is silent as to whether the military
will change policy to accept reenlistment of members previously discharged under
DADT, despite the military’s general policy preventing those with other-than-honorable
and dishonorable discharge from reenlisting. Id.
37
Morality is the crux of Justice Scalia’s dissent in Lawrence, in which he argues
that based on the majority’s holding, other laws based on morality, such as laws against

2010]

THE MORALITY OF “DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL”

161

is a law that combines morality and utilitarian purpose, Cook and Witt
both call for heightened review. Under Witt, DADT would likely be
unconstitutional when applying intermediate scrutiny. Cook’s deference
to Congress can be discounted following cases in the military courts that
explicitly question such blind deference.38 Lofton’s analysis of Lawrence
can be discounted as obiter dictum because the Eleventh Circuit found
that Lawrence was not controlling in that case.39 Therefore, Witt’s threefactor test is the best interpretation of the heightened scrutiny that
Lawrence requires.
DADT has been abandoned because it was bad public policy.
Furthermore, DADT could no longer pass constitutional muster before its
repeal, regardless of whether its justification was purely moral or not. If
during this interim enforcement period the conditions for repealing
DADT are not met, and Congress is unwilling to act to remove the
policy, the Court could grant certiorari and strike down “Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell.” Furthermore, the Court could apply the Ninth Circuit’s
reasoning in Witt for any application of DADT to an individual. The
courts could also use the Witt framework to reinstate any member of the
military discharged during this interim period,40 or to reinstate a member
of the military that was discharged in the past under the policy and
prevented from reenlisting based on a previous DADT discharge.41
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Lawrence v. Texas has been problematic to lower courts and
lawyers due primarily to its unclear language and rationale. Before

“bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery,
fornication, bestiality, and obscenity . . .” are all drawn into question. Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
38
See, e.g., United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198, 203 (C.A.A.F. 2004).
39
Lofton v. Sec’y. of Dep’t. of Childr and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 817 (11th
Cir. 2004) (finding that “the holding of Lawrence does not control the present case.
Apart from the shared homosexuality component, there are marked differences in the
facts of the two cases.”).
40
Senate Bill 4023 not only conditions the repeal of DADT on certain factors, supra
note 34, but it also explicitly states that the repeal is not effective until 60 days after the
last of the conditions is satisfied. S. 4023, 111th Cong. § 2(b) (2010). During this
minimum 60 day period, servicemembers could still be discharged because DADT is still
in effect. Id. at § 2(c).
41
Timothy J. Gibbons, FLA. TIMES UNION, Aug. 12, 2010, http://jacksonville.com/
news/military/2010-08-12/story/kings-bay-sailor-being-discharged-because-hes-gay.
Seaman Jarod McIntosh, like others dismissed under DADT, received a less-thanhonorable discharge, which prevents reenlistment in the armed services under the various
regulations of the service branches. Id. See also, Army Reg. 601–210 (2007).
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Congress began to review “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,”42 Lawrence provided
a basis for courts to challenge DADT, and cases following Lawrence
provided Congress with greater impetus to act.43 Even though Congress
has now passed a repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,44 the Lawrence
decision is critical to our understanding of the zone of privacy, the ability
of Congress to regulate the military through other policies such as Article
125,45 and possible challenges to DADT during the interim period before
the policy is fully repealed.46
A. “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”
The law commonly known as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” is the
product of a compromise between former President Clinton, the military,
and Congress.47 But military policy regarding sodomy has been around
long before Clinton. Since the Revolutionary War era, military policy
called for the discharge of those found guilty of sodomy.48 The idea of
screening homosexuals per se emerged in 1942, after the psychiatric
community labeled homosexuality a mental illness, and the military took
notice by issuing the first regulations outright banning homosexuals from
serving.49 The military asked enlisting troops about their sexual
42

President Barack Obama announced in his January 2010 State of the Union
address his intent to have DADT repealed. Since that time, Senator Kirsten Gillibrand
has introduced an amendment to the federal budget to curb the financing of the
investigations and dismissals under DADT. Celeste Katz, Sen. Kristen [sic] Gillibrand
Will Propose Budget Amendment to Cut Funding For ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,’ N.Y.
DAILY NEWS, Feb. 7, 2010, http://www.nydailynews.com/ny_local/2010/02/07/2010-0207_gilly_says_dont_fund_dont_ask.html. In addition, top defense officials, including
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the joint
chiefs of staff, testified before a Senate panel on Feb. 2, 2010 that they will begin the
process of determining how, not if, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” should be repealed to
minimally effect the military’s current operations. Elisabeth Bumiller, Top Defense
Officials Seek End to ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,’ N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/03/us/politics/03military.html.
43
Anna Stolley Persky, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: Don’t Work? Courts and Congress
Raise New Challenges to Policy on Gays in the Military, ABA JOURNAL, Oct. 1, 2008,
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/dont_ask_dont_tell_dont_work.
44
Hulse, supra note 33; S. 4023, 111th Cong. (2010).
45
See infra Part III.B.2.
46
S. 4023, 111th Cong. § 2(b) (2010) (conditioning the repeal of DADT on several
factors and stating that the repeal of DADT is not effective until sixty days after the last
of the conditions is met).
47
Remarks Announcing the New Policy on Homosexuals in the Military, 1 PUB.
PAPERS 1111 (July 19, 1993).
48
RANDY SHILTS, CONDUCT UNBECOMING: GAYS & LESBIANS IN THE U.S. MILITARY
VIETNAM TO THE PERSIAN GULF 11 (St. Martin’s Press, Griffin ed. 2005). Unfortunate Lt.
Gotthold Frederick Enslin “became the first known soldier to be dismissed from the U.S.
military for homosexuality [sodomy]” in 1778. Id. at 11.
49
Id. at 16–17.
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orientation before they joined the military, and those admitting to their
homosexuality were not allowed to join.50 Anyone later discovered or
even alleged to be homosexual was usually discharged by the armed
forces.51
Yet on the campaign trail, candidate Clinton stated that, once
elected, he would lift the ban on homosexuals from serving in the
military.52 After taking office, President Clinton began the long process
that would result in DADT by directing the Secretary of Defense to
submit a draft Executive Order “ending discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation in determining who may serve in the Armed
Services . . . .”53 Congress responded to President Clinton’s executive
order by commencing various hearings to review military policy
regarding the service of homosexuals; this Congressional action
diminished the chances of President Clinton’s success to overturn the
policy banning homosexuals from serving.54 In July 1993, President
Clinton proposed a compromise policy, which allowed homosexual
applicants to the military to avoid answering questions about their sexual
orientation upon entry, but after joining the armed forces, these
homosexual servicemen and women could be separated from the military
for admitting to being a “practicing” homosexual or for committing
homosexual sexual acts.55 The House and Senate Armed Forces
Committees proposed to codify the President’s policy,56 and the Act
became law in November 1993. DADT was not the first law Congress
passed regulating sodomy in the military, but it was the first to expressly
regulate sodomy by explicitly targeting homosexuals.
On December 18, 2010, the United States Senate passed a bill
repealing DADT, which had already been passed by the House.57

50

Id. at 17.
Id.
52
Curtis Wilkie, Harvard Tosses Warmup Queries to Clinton On Eve of N.H.
Debate, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 31, 1991, at 22.
53
Memorandum on Ending Discrimination in the Armed Forces, 1 PUB. PAPERS 23
(Jan. 29, 1993).
54
Assessment of the Plan to Lift the Ban on Homosexuals in the Military: Hearings
Before the Military Forces and Personnel Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Armed
Services, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); Policy Concerning Homosexuality in the Armed
Forces: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993); Implications of Lifting the Ban on Homosexuals in the Military: Hearings Before
the House Comm. on Armed Services, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
55
Remarks Announcing the New Policy on Homosexuals in the Military, 1 PUB.
PAPERS 1111 (July 19, 1993).
56
S. Rep. No. 103–112, at 270 (1993); H.R. Rep. No. 103–200, at 287 (1993)
reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2073 at 2074.
57
Hulse, supra note 33.
51
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President Obama has signed the bill into law.58 The language of the bill
conditions the repeal of DADT on various factors,59 and there will be at
least a sixty-day lag before the policy can become effective.60 This
interim period leaves in doubt the current status of homosexual military
members and the implications should they out themselves.61 This means
that until DADT is fully repealed, new Department of Defense
regulations are issued, and servicemembers can no longer be discharged
under the policy, there is still a legal basis for challenging the application
of DADT. Additionally, for those servicemembers already discharged
who seek to reenlist once DADT is fully repealed, their reenlistment may
be barred due to their discharge status as a direct result of their discharge
for violating DADT. Those servicemembers still have a constitutional
claim against their discharge status under Witt. This is particularly
important because the repeal passed by Congress is explicit in that it does
not create a cause of action.62
B. UCMJ Article 125, Sodomy
Article 125 is a military code provision in the UCMJ that prohibits
sodomy, similar to the Georgia law that Lawrence struck down in the
civilian sphere.63 Article 125 defines sodomy as an “unnatural carnal
copulation with another person of the same or opposite sex . . . .”64 Like
DADT, Article 125 punishes sexual conduct in the military; but unlike
DADT, it does not specifically target homosexuals.65 In addition, Article
125 does not have the same mandatory separation element.66 While the

58

Gell, supra note 34.
S. 4023, 111th Cong. § 2(b) (2010) (conditioning repeal of DADT on the receipt
and acceptance of the report by the Secretary of Defense, written certifications of the
President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff accepting the
policy change, and the issuance of new regulations by the Department of Defense).
60
Id. (stating that the repeal is not effective until 60 days after the last of the listed
conditions is satisfied).
61
Rowan Scarborough, Gay Troops Advised to Wait Before Coming Out,
WASHINGTON TIMES, Dec. 20, 2010, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/
dec/20/gay-service-members-advised-to-wait-before-coming-/.
62
S. 4023, 111th Cong. § 2(e) (2010) (stating that this bill does not create a private
cause of action).
63
10 U.S.C. § 925 (2006).
64
Id. “It is considered unnatural carnal copulation for a person to take into [his or
her] mouth or anus the sexual organ of another person or of an animal; or to place [his or
her] sexual organ into the mouth or anus of another person or of an animal; or to have
carnal copulation in any opening of the body, except the sexual parts, with another
person; or to have carnal copulation [in any opening of the body of] an animal.” Manual
for Courts-Martial, United States (hereinafter MCM) pt. IV, para. 51(c) (2008 ed.).
65
Id.
66
Id.
59
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definition of sodomy in Article 125 would constitute homosexual
conduct in violation of DADT if committed by a practicing homosexual,
Article 125 applies to both heterosexuals and homosexuals alike,
punishing all acts within the policy’s purview.67 The application of
Article 125 is important because if Lawrence protects consensual
intercourse between adults conducted in private, then this could affect
the constitutionality of Article 125.68
C. The Law Before Lawrence v. Texas
Before Lawrence was decided in 2003, laws criminalizing
homosexual sodomy were constitutionally permissible under Bowers.69
Decided in 1986, at a time when homosexuality was at the furthest
fringes of society,70 Bowers determined that because there was not a
history and tradition of a right protecting homosexual sodomy, states
were free to criminalize such conduct.71 This meant that in order to
successfully challenge laws prohibiting sodomy, the Court would not
only have to find that such a right exists under substantive due process of
the Fourteenth Amendment, but would also have to either overrule
Bowers or find a credible way to distinguish it.
Because most cases challenging DADT come as substantive due
process claims under the Fourteenth Amendment,72 courts must first
determine which standard of substantive due process review should
apply. The three different standards of constitutional review under the
Due Process Clause have evolved out of Supreme Court jurisprudence
over the past century.73 The minimal level of review is rational basis
review: “[a]ll laws challenged under either due process or equal
protection must meet at least rational basis review.”74 Under this
standard, the Court will uphold the law “unless the challenger proves that
67

Id. Both sections (a) and (b) of Article 125 begin with “[a]ny person,” which
indicates that the statute would apply to any member of the military, hetero- or
homosexual. 10 U.S.C. §§ 925(a) and (b) (2006).
68
See infra Part III.B.2.
69
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
70
See generally SHILTS, supra note 48.
71
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190, 196.
72
See, e.g., Witt, 527 F.3d at 809. Major Witt complains that DADT is
unconstitutional under substantive due process. Id. at 809. Major Witt also complains
that DADT violates equal protection under the law. Id.
73
The renowned footnote 4 in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152 n.4 (1938) is generally attributed as the catalyst for the consideration of fundamental
rights targeting “discrete and insular minorities.” From this was born the Court’s
categorization of rights, and the corresponding levels of scrutiny. See, e.g., ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 539 (3d ed., 2006).
74
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 73, at 540.
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the law does not serve any conceivable legitimate purpose or that it is not
a reasonable [or rational] way to attain the end.”75
Intermediate scrutiny is the middle tier, and under this standard, the
challenged law will be upheld if it is “substantially related to an
important government purpose.”76 Under this standard of review, the
government’s goal must be something more than merely legitimate: it
must be important. Unlike rational basis review, under intermediate
scrutiny, the government usually bears the burden proof.77
Finally, the most exacting standard of review is strict scrutiny. This
standard articulates that a law will be upheld only if it is “necessary to
achieve a compelling government purpose.”78 The law must further be
“narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests.”79 This
most exacting standard is a least restrictive means test. Unless the
government can prove that its goal is compelling and used the least
restrictive means, the law will fail.80
D. Lawrence v. Texas
The most effective means of analyzing Lawrence, as it pertains to
any discussion of DADT and the Lofton, Witt, and Cook circuit split, is to
consider the opinion from the two different vantage points utilized by
lower courts: what did the Lawrence court say or not say, and what cases
did the Court rely on in Lawrence. Courts have utilized the former
method to find that Lawrence’s language does not specifically define a
new fundamental right,81 while other courts have used Lawrence’s
language as articulating a new liberty interest.82 Courts that have utilized
the latter method have only done so to place Lawrence within the context
of other fundamental rights cases to determine that Lawrence must be
placed within this category if the decision is to make any sense.83
In Lawrence, police in Harris County, Texas, responding to a
weapons disturbance, entered John Geddes Lawrence’s home and
witnessed him and another man, Tyson Garner, “engaging in a sexual
75

Id.
Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); Lehr v.
Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 266 (1983)).
77
Id. at 541.
78
Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995);
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
79
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 73, at 542 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 509 U.S. 306,
326 (2003)).
80
Id.
81
See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Childr and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 817
(11th Cir. 2004).
82
See, e.g., Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 817 (9th Cir. 2008).
83
Id. at 816.
76
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act.”84 Both men were arrested, tried, and convicted under a Texas
sodomy statute that criminalized “any contact between any part of the
genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person.”85 The
two men challenged their convictions under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari.86 The case challenged the sodomy statute on
three bases: Equal Protection, Due Process, and whether Bowers is no
longer good precedent.87
1. The Court’s Language
Justice Kennedy began the opinion explaining the nature of the
liberty interest at issue, noting that liberty protects us from unwarranted
governmental intrusions.88 This protection is key to the notion of a zone
of privacy. And the liberty at issue here, wrote Justice Kennedy, is not
just individual liberty but also liberty in “its spatial and more
transcendent dimensions.”89 Before expounding on its reasoning, the
Court concluded that the proper query is “whether the petitioners were
free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their
liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution[,]” thereby bypassing the Equal Protection question, and
directly implicating the decision in Bowers.90 The Court then reframed
the issue in Bowers, saying that the Bowers court considered the issue in
too narrow a scope and that the law at issue in Bowers and in Lawrence
had greater implications “upon the most private human conduct, sexual

84

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 562–63 (2003).
Id. (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (2003)).
86
Id. at 563–64.
87
Id. at 564. (“1. Whether Petitioners’ criminal convictions under the Texas
‘Homosexual Conduct’ law—which criminalizes sexual intimacy by same-sex couples,
but not identical behavior by different-sex couples—violate the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantee of equal protection of laws? 2. Whether Petitioners’ criminal convictions for
adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home violate their vital interests in liberty and
privacy protect by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? 3. Whether
Bowers v. Hardwick . . . should be overruled?”).
88
Id. at 562. (“Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions
into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the State is not omnipresent in the
home. And there are other spheres of our lives and existence, outside the home, where
the State should not be a dominant presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds.
Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief,
expression, and certain intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the person
in both its spatial and more transcendent dimensions.”).
89
Id.at 562.
90
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564.
85

168

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 7:155

behavior, and in the most private of places, the home.”91 The Court
explicitly noted that the Bowers court “fail[ed] to appreciate the extent of
the liberty at stake.”92
After noting these deficiencies, the Court counseled “against
attempts by the State, or a court, to define the meaning of the relationship
or to set its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse to an institution
the law protects.”93 Though this edict seems to lay out a clear standard
for courts and state legislatures, namely that the State should not regulate
the intimate relationships between persons absent injury to another or
abuse of a legally protected institution, the implication of this statement
on the relationships of homosexuals and State regulation thereof is less
clear.94 Whether marriage would constitute a legally protected institution
that would warrant regulation of same-sex unions was never directly
addressed by the Court.
The Court then acknowledged that the liberty interest is further
buttressed when it occurs within the confines of a private home.95 The
Constitutional liberty is at its strongest, and the State’s regulatory
authority at its weakest, when the relationship in question shows no sign
of injury to another, or threat to a legally protected institution.96 The
liberty interest is particularly strong when it finds expression in the
privacy of the home, which has traditionally been recognized as one of
the greatest domains of privacy from State intrusion.97
91
Id. at 567. Justice Kennedy also notes here, “[t]he statutes do seek to control a
personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is
within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals.” Id. This
statement indicates the Court’s unwillingness to enter the contentious debate about samesex marriage, even while finding that the underlying sexual act cannot constitutionally
sustain criminal conviction.
92
Id. (holding that by reasoning “that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to
engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it
would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to
have sexual intercourse.”).
93
Id.
94
It is unclear if the Court meant that it would be acceptable to criminalize adultery
but not fornication because the former is within the confines of the legally protected
institution of marriage and the latter is not. It seems, based on context in the sentence,
that the legally protected institution to which Justice Kennedy is alluding could only be
marriage, because the court is explicitly discussing state laws that define the meaning of a
relationship.
95
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
96
Id.
97
Id. Justice Kennedy, in this portion of the opinion, is looking to the Court’s
jurisprudence regarding the Bill of Rights, where the constitutional guarantees of privacy
in the home are readily apparent. Id. at 567. The Third Amendment, which prevents the
government from quartering soldiers in peoples’ homes without consent of the owner, is
one instance of a respected zone of privacy regarding one’s home. U.S. CONST. amend.
III. The Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is a
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The Court’s full articulation of the liberty interest protected by the
Constitution in Lawrence is, “[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression in
intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one
element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected
by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this
choice.”98 As evidenced by this language, the Court was exceedingly
vague in declaring specifically what the Constitution protects. The
holding of the opinion defined the liberty interest as intimate conduct,
but intimate conduct is never fully defined, and the Court never
suggested that all intimate conduct was protected by the constitution.99
Especially when considering DADT and Article 125 of the UCMJ, the
Court’s holding has led lower courts to struggle with the boundaries of
the liberty interest in Lawrence, which has in turn led to great difficulty
in discerning what protections the decision intended to confer in
situations not exactly identical to the one in Lawrence.
The Court’s reasoning regarding why the Texas sodomy law did not
pass Constitutional muster is even more confusing; “[t]he Texas statute
furthers no legitimate interest which can justify its intrusion into the
personal and private life of the individual.”100 The Court’s terminology,
“no legitimate interest,” is a hallmark of rational basis review, yet
typically under this standard, a law such as the one in question would
have been considered rationally justified and thereby upheld. This
language has created confusion with respect to whether the Court was
applying its traditional rational basis review, or whether it was applying a
form of heightened scrutiny. This is significant because only rights that
are considered “fundamental,” and therefore assuredly protected in toto
by the Constitution, are reviewed under heightened scrutiny.
Consequently, lower courts have pondered whether the right expounded
in Lawrence is really a fundamental right, because the Court never
expressly called it such. The significance of identification as a
“fundamental” right is that it requires the greatest constitutional

similar instance of respecting the privacy, though this time of the individual. U.S. CONST.
amend. IV. The Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, fundamentally, is a right to keep
private information private. U.S. CONST. amend. V. These provisions taken together
demonstrate a zone of privacy like that articulated by the Court in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
98
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. It is unclear, however, if this “right” is the right to
choose with whom to have intercourse, or if it means the right for persons of the same sex
to form an intimate bond like a heterosexual relationship.
99
If Justice Kennedy really intended to implicate all intimate conduct in the decision,
others sexually regulated acts, such as incest, statutory rape, and other sexual crimes
would no longer be constitutionally permissible.
100
Id. at 578.
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protection and the strictest standard of scrutiny, which in and of itself is
usually outcome determinative.101
In addition to finding that the Texas law furthered no legitimate
interest, the Court also stated that the government made no showing that
its “interest in circumscribing personal choice is somehow more
legitimate or urgent.”102 The use of the words “legitimate” and “urgent”
reflects terminology reminiscent of heightened scrutiny. The lower
courts, among others, struggle to answer the question whether the Court
intended to implicate the traditional rubric of Due Process review when
using this specific language in Lawrence, or if the Court intended to
create a new standard.103
The Court said,
[t]he present case does not involve minors. It does not involve
persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in
relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does
not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve
whether the government must give formal recognition to any
relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.104

By defining the liberty interest in the negative, the Court established that
there are acts not protected by the liberty interest, including intercourse
with minors, coercive intercourse or intercourse with a high possibility of
coercion, public intercourse, prostitution, or the formal recognition of
homosexual unions.105 Then the Court said, “[t]he case does involve two
adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in
sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle.”106 This positive
reinforcement helps establish that when the sexual conduct is between
two consenting adults, their actions are protected.
The Court established the above parameters based on the history of
sodomy prosecutions in western civilization. The Court noted that “there
is no longstanding history in this country of laws directed at homosexual
101

See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term–Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). But see Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact:
An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793
(2006).
102
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577 (emphasis added).
103
See, e.g., United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198, 203 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (noting that
other courts have struggled with standard of review required by Lawrence, whether it be
rational basis review, or strict scrutiny) (citing Standhardt v. Superior Court of Arizona,
77 P.3d 451, 457 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003); Fields v. Palmdale School Dist., 271 F. Supp. 2d
1217, 1221 n. 7 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
104
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (emphasis added).
105
Id.
106
Id.
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conduct as a distinct matter.”107 It then explained that sodomy
prosecutions typically entailed sex with minors, rape, coercion, or
bestiality.108 The Court then contrasted the Bowers decision with the
emerging trend of increasing tolerance for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender (LGBT) rights in the West, and noted that as part of this
greater Western history and tradition, Bowers cannot stand.109 This
seems to have altered the scope of the “history and tradition” inquiry,
which is usually outcome determinative as Bowers readily
demonstrates.110 By redefining the scope of the inquiry and broadening
it to consider the Western world’s evolving history and tradition, the
Court has either altered the way this analysis will be conducted in future
Due Process inquiries, or it has created an aberration, enabling the Court
to reach its ultimate conclusion.
Justice Scalia vociferously dissented and seized on the fact that the
Court never called the right at issue “fundamental,”111 arguing that if the
right were “fundamental,” the Court would have been required to apply
its traditional strict scrutiny standard.112 Instead, as Justice Scalia
indicated, the Court overruled Bowers and struck down the Texas law
without challenging the central legal conclusion in Bowers, that there
was no fundamental right to homosexual sodomy.113 Justice Scalia also
argued that Washington v. Glucksberg114 established the fact that “only
fundamental rights which are ‘deeply rooted in this nation’s history and
tradition’ qualify for anything other than rational basis scrutiny under the

107

Id. at 568.
Id. at 569 (“[Nineteenth] century sodomy prosecutions typically involved relations
between men and minor girls or minor boys, relations between adults involving force,
relations between adults implicating disparity in status, or relations between men and
animals.”). Each of the specific categories the court details become the very exceptions
to the protection of the liberty interest the court lays out later. Id.
109
Id. at 568.
110
See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190–91 (1986). As the Court in
Lawrence later determined, the Court’s definition of the history and tradition in Bowers
was too narrow, and the narrowness of its definition of history and tradition was its
precedential infirmity. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 567. In Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
325–26 (1937), the court stated that those things deeply rooted in our nation’s history and
traditions are those “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” such that “neither liberty
nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702
(1997) reaffirmed this principle in the modern string of fundamental rights cases.
111
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
112
Id.
113
Id. This part of Justice Scalia’s dissent has provided grounds for many courts,
including the Lofton court, to find that the right is therefore not fundamental and no
heightened scrutiny should apply. See infra Part II.E.1. See also Muth v. Frank, 412
F.3d 808, 817 (7th Cir. 2005).
114
521 U.S. 702 (1997).
108
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doctrine of ‘substantive due process.’”115 Justice Scalia challenged what
he viewed as the Court’s redefinition of history and tradition in
Lawrence. He argued that legislatures have always been able to legislate
with morality, and morality legislation should be left to the prerogative
of the state governments.116 This issue of morality legislation is likely
one of the major reasons for the Court’s split between majority and
dissent in this decision.
2. The Court’s Actions
Although the language of the Court was both confusing and
problematic, the Court’s actions in Lawrence, as well as its justifications
for those actions, demonstrate the Court’s intent to solidify Lawrence as
part of the history of privacy-rights cases. As part of its effort to reframe
the issue in Bowers and to establish the Due Process protection of the
right in Lawrence, the Court relied on a series of fundamental rights
cases to solidify its Constitutional footing in Lawrence, placing
Lawrence squarely within the privacy-rights line of cases. The cases the
Court relied on, other than Romer v. Evans,117 are cases in which the
Court established a fundamental right, imbued with the greatest
protection the Constitution affords.118
The Court began its consideration with Griswold v. Connecticut and
stated that Griswold “established that the right to make certain decisions
regarding sexual conduct extends beyond the marital relationship.”119
Decided in 1965, Griswold set the stage for future cases in which the
Court would look to the penumbras of Constitutional guarantees to
define an area of personal liberty and autonomy, the zone of privacy,
upon which the State may not encroach.120 This line of reasoning

115
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 588 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (quoting
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721) (citing Palko, 302 U.S. 319 (1937)).
116
Id. at 589–90.
117
517 U.S. 620 (1996). Although Romer is an Equal Protection case, and not a Due
Process case, it is significant here for two reasons. First, it represents the first major
victory for the LGBT community in the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Gayle L. Pettinga,
Rational Basis With Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779
(1987). Second, it is often considered a case where the Court applied “rational basis with
bite,” laying some groundwork for the ambiguous standard of scrutiny used in Lawrence.
See, e.g., id.
118
These cases are Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l,
431 U.S. 678 (1977); and Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
119
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565.
120
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (“The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees
in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that
help give them life and substance.”).
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continued through Eisenstadt v. Baird,121 where the Court held that
individuals, whether married or single, have the right to be free of
government intrusion “into matters so fundamentally affecting a person
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”122
Through this line of case law, the Court determined that “[o]ur
obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral
code.”123 The Court’s statement regarding morality in Casey and its
decision to overrule Bowers directly challenges the ability of religious
groups to legislate their own morality. Morality is often the explicit, or
at least an implicit, reason that opponents to LGBT rights use to justify
regulatory policy.
Morality’s place in the law was specifically addressed in Lawrence.
When the Lawrence Court overruled Bowers, it held that Justice
Stevens’s dissent should have been controlling and that his analysis
would apply to the case at bar.124 In his dissent in Bowers, Justice
Stevens said, “the fact that the governing majority in a State has
traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient
reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.”125 Justice Stevens’s
dissent in Bowers may be an indication of what the Court actually meant
when it struck down the Texas law: morality is an insufficient basis on
its own to uphold a law that violates a constitutional liberty. Justice
Stevens even goes so far as to say that a legitimate interest cannot be
justified by “a habitual dislike for, or ignorance about, the disfavored
group.”126
This reasoning is profound because it leads to the very heart of the
Lawrence case and the Texas statute in question: the moral judgments of
society and their enactment into law. Not only did the above reasoning
allow the Court to strike down the Texas sodomy law, but it is also of
extreme import in other contemporary battles waged over LGBT rights,
including the legitimacy of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” When morality is
removed as a basis for legislation, biases against the LGBT community
are reduced to constitutionally violative restrictions on substantive due
process and equal protection.

121
405 U.S. 438 (1972). This case is also an Equal Protection case, where a
fundamental right for married couples is extended, under the guaranty of equal
protection, to unmarried couples. Id. at 453.
122
Id. at 453.
123
Casey, 505 U.S. at 850.
124
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“Justice Stevens’ analysis, in our view, should have
been controlling in Bowers and should control here.”).
125
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
126
Id. at 219.
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E. The Three-Way Circuit Split
In the wake of Lawrence, many courts have been called upon to
clarify its meaning and hone its standards.127 Three such cases dealing
explicitly with homosexuality have made their way to the courts of
appeal, Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children and Family
Services,128 Witt v. Department of the Air Force,129 and Cook v. Gates.130
This comment focuses only on these three cases because they center
specifically on the treatment of homosexuals after Lawrence.
Furthermore, these cases establish a three-way circuit split over the
standard of review required by Lawrence,131 the constitutional test to be
applied for heightened scrutiny,132 and the amount of deference that
should be given to Congress when it regulates the military.133 These
cases help answer the lingering questions about how the Lawrence and
Bowers morality standard would apply to DADT, and the reasons for
heightened scrutiny.
1. Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children and Family
Services, Eleventh Circuit
Although Lofton did not deal with DADT, the case considered
whether a Florida statute that prevented homosexuals from adopting
children was constitutional following Lawrence.134 The court began its
analysis by asking “whether Lawrence announced a new fundamental
right to private sexual intimacy.”135 Similar to Justice Scalia’s dissent in
Lawrence, the Eleventh Circuit focused on the fact that the Supreme
Court had never called the right in Lawrence “fundamental.”136 This was
of great importance because if the right were fundamental, there could be
127
See, e.g., Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2008) (striking
down a Texas law that makes it a crime to sell or promote sexual devices following
Lawrence); Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (upholding an
Alabama law prohibiting the sale and promotion of sex toys under a Lawrence-based
constitutional challenge).
128
358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004).
129
527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2008).
130
528 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008).
131
In Lofton, 358 F.3d at 817, the court determines that no heightened review shall
apply, while in Witt and Cook, both courts establish a heightened standard of review.
Witt, 527 F.3d at 813; Cook, 528 F.3d at 56.
132
The Witt court establishes that the Sell test will be the applicable test under
intermediate scrutiny, while the Cook court declines to apply that test. Witt, 527 F.3d at
818; Cook, 528 F.3d at 45 n.1.
133
The Witt court determines that deference to Congress does not require abdication,
whereas the court in Cook does. Witt, 527 F.3d at 821; Cook, 528 F.3d at 60.
134
Lofton, 358 F.3d at 806–07.
135
Id. at 815.
136
Id. at 817.
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no question as to the standard of scrutiny required by the Court.137
Because the Lawrence court never used this key term, the Eleventh
Circuit explained that it was “hesitant to infer a new fundamental liberty
interest from an opinion whose language and reasoning are inconsistent
with standard fundamental-rights analysis.”138 The court had two major
contentions regarding the use of the term “fundamental right.”139
Because of what the court found as Lawrence’s narrow holding in
articulating the right and the standard of review required, the Eleventh
Circuit did not find any need to apply a heightened standard of review.140
Notably , the precedential value of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in
Lofton is discounted by the fact that the court expressly found that
Lawrence did not control the case at bar.141 If Lawrence was not
controlling precedent in Lofton, then the court’s discussion of Lawrence
reduces to mere dicta.
2. Witt v. Department of the Air Force, Ninth Circuit
Witt was a dramatic departure from Lofton and established a clear
split between the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits. Major Margaret Witt was
literally the face of the United States Air Force, prominently featured in
Air Force recruitment and promotional materials.142 She received
numerous medals and commendations, and she was very well regarded
by colleagues and superiors alike.143 The case arose because Major Witt
was in a relationship with a civilian woman for over five years while she
was on active duty in the Air Force.144 The two women, however, never
had sexual relations while Major Witt was on duty or while she was
present on the grounds of any Air Force base.145 The two women shared
a home that was located approximately 250 miles away from McChord
Air Force Base, where Major Witt was stationed.146 During her entire
137

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Lofton, 358 F.3d at 816.
139
Id. (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21) (“First, the Lawrence opinion
contains virtually no inquiry into the question of whether the petitioners’ asserted right is
one of ‘those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this
Nation’s history and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that
neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.’ Second, the opinion
notably never provides the ‘careful description of the asserted fundamental liberty
interest’ that is to accompany fundamental-rights analysis.”).
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 809 (9th Cir. 2008).
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id. at 809–10.
138
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military career, Major Witt kept her sexual orientation a secret from her
fellow servicemen and women.147
In July of 2004, just a year after Lawrence was decided, Major Witt
was notified that she was under investigation based on allegations of
homosexuality.148 Major Witt refused to make any contact with the
investigating officer or the Air Force chaplain who contacted her about
her homosexuality.149
By November 2004, formal separation
proceedings began, and Major Witt, one year short of twenty years of
service and a full Air Force pension, was told that she would no longer
receive any pay or points towards promotion during the proceedings.150
After Witt received a notice of discharge action and requested an
administrative hearing, the military board “found that Major Witt had
engaged in homosexual acts and had stated that she was a homosexual in
violation of DADT.”151 The Secretary of the Air Force acted on the
board’s recommendation in July of 2007, “ordering that Major Witt
receive an honorable discharge” from the Air Force.152 Major Witt was
not yet separated from the military when her complaint was filed in
federal court.153
Major Witt argued, inter alia, that DADT violates substantive due
process based on the holding in Lawrence.154 The Ninth Circuit began its
analysis by noting that in order to analyze Witt’s substantive due process
claim, it must first determine the proper level of scrutiny required by
Lawrence.155 The court then observed that, despite the Air Force’s
arguments that this issue has been settled by other courts of appeals, the
only court to squarely address the issue was the Eleventh Circuit in
Lofton, which did not apply any form of heightened review.156 The Ninth
Circuit also noted that another court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces, considered a challenge to UCMJ Article 125 implicating
Lawrence and applied a heightened standard of review.157 Although both
of these decisions presented persuasive authority, neither was binding,
and the court proceeded to split from the Eleventh Circuit.158
147

Id. at 810.
Witt, 527 F.3d at 810.
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Id. at 812.
154
Witt, 527 F.3d at 811.
155
Id. at 813.
156
Id. at 815.
157
Id. at 816 (referencing United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198 (C.A.A.F. 2004)).
158
Marcum and its progeny will be considered in a subsequent section for the parallel
value of their analyses on the consideration of the liberty interest in Lawrence and its
148
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The Ninth Circuit decided that it would be more useful to analyze
Lawrence under the rubric of what the Court did, rather than what it said,
because the court had no desire to deal with the subjectivity of linguistic
analysis and parse the language of the opinion to divine its true
meaning.159 The court reasoned that linguistic analysis of the ambiguous
text in Lawrence would lead to a dissection of isolated passages without
their proper context, which would lead to the problem of relying on key
words in isolation as the basis of a judicial decision.160 Relying on the
Lawrence court’s actions allowed the Ninth Circuit to fit Major Witt’s
case into the privacy rights line of cases discussed in Lawrence.
The court first noted that the Lawrence court overruled Bowers, and
could not have done so applying rational basis review because rational
basis review would have required the Court to determine that the law in
question in Lawrence “lacked ‘any reasonably conceivable state of facts
that could provide a rational basis for the classification,’” and any
theoretical justification would prove sufficient.161 For the Court to have
overruled Bowers and simultaneously strike down the Texas sodomy
statute, something more than rational basis review was required. Had the
Court applied mere rational basis review, a paradigm of judicial restraint,
the Court never would have overruled Bowers or considered the liberty
interest of Mr. Lawrence.162
Second, the court noted that the cases relied on by the Supreme
Court—other than Romer v. Evans—were all cases that applied
heightened scrutiny.163 For the Supreme Court to rely on a long line of
cases that applied heightened scrutiny, it would be counterintuitive that
the case at bar would then be considered under the low bar of rational
basis review. It also seems to suggest that the Court was reframing the
issue in Lawrence to place the case within the privacy-rights framework.

implications on military policy. The decision in Marcum, however, is not being
considered as part of the circuit split at issue in the Comment primarily because the Court
of Appeals for the Armed Forces falls outside of the fold of the regular courts of appeals
because it is an Article I tribunal exercising worldwide appellate jurisdiction over
members of the U.S. Armed Forces on active duty and other persons subject to the
UCMJ. CRS, Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction Over Military Court Cases, 1 (Oct.
6, 2008).
159
Witt, 527 F.3d at 816.
160
Id.
161
Id. (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)).
162
Id. (“We cannot reconcile what the Supreme Court did in Lawrence with the
minimal protections afforded by traditional rational basis review.”).
163
These cases were Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Carey, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Roe,
410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); and Griswold, 381 U.S. 479
(1965). See discussion of these cases supra, Part II.D.2.
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Third, the Ninth Circuit discussed the Supreme Court’s rationale,
analysis, and holding in Lawrence, which are inconsistent with rational
basis review.164 Had rational basis been the standard of review, the Court
would not have been required to “identify a legitimate interest to ‘justify’
the particular intrusion of liberty at issue in Lawrence; regardless of the
liberty involved, any hypothetical rationale for the law would do.”165
Although the discussion of a legitimate interest is a quintessential notion
of rational basis review, and as such is a strong indication of the standard
of review a court is applying, legitimate under rational basis review
means nearly anything that can substantiate the law.166 Even a reason
created post hoc is sufficient.167
Finally, the court indicated a reluctance to apply strict scrutiny
because the decision in Lawrence did not conclude the right was
“fundamental,” nor did the “Supreme Court discuss narrow tailoring or a
compelling state interest . . . .”168 In a footnote, the court indicated its
agreement with the Lofton court that strict scrutiny should not be the
relevant standard, but then concluded that some form of heightened
scrutiny did apply, thereby parting ways with the Eleventh Circuit.169
The court then turned to Sell v. United States,170 another recent
Supreme Court case that considered a substantive due process claim,
because Sell contained a level of “scrutiny that resembles and expands
upon the analysis performed in Lawrence.”171 The Ninth Circuit found
that in Sell, the Supreme Court “recognized a ‘significant’ liberty
interest . . . and balanced that liberty interest against the ‘legitimate’ and
‘important’ state interest . . . .”172 Because the phrasing of its analysis
164

Witt, 527 F.3d at 817.
Id.
166
See discussion supra, Part II.E.1.
167
Witt, 527 F.3d at 817.
168
Id. at 817–18.
169
Id. at 818 n.6. Here it is important to note also that Judge Canby, writing in
dissent, would hold that strict scrutiny should apply because the Supreme Court, though it
did not call the right at issue in Lawrence fundamental, treated it as such. Id. Judge
Canby notes, “the important individual values of liberty [the Supreme Court]
recognizes . . . require strict scrutiny of governmental encroachment on that right.” Id. at
823 (Canby, J., dissenting).
170
539 U.S. 166 (2003). Sell was a case involving a man with a long history of
delusional disorder who was deemed incompetent to stand trial. Id. at 170. Sell was
ordered to be hospitalized and prescribed antipsychotic medication by the medical staff.
Id. at 170–71. Sell did not want to take the medication, and the court ordered that he be
given the medicines involuntarily, and that this might also improve his competence to
stand trial. Id. at 171. The Supreme Court’s Sell test was used to determine when the
medication could be forcibly given under the Constitution. Id. at 186.
171
Witt, 527 F.3d at 818.
172
Id. (quoting Sell, 539 U.S. at 178).
165
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and rationale so closely resembled that of Lawrence, the court stated that
the Sell test should be controlling for the intermediate level of scrutiny
demanded by Lawrence.173
The court then determined that because DADT “attempts to intrude
upon the personal and private lives of homosexuals[] in a manner that
implicates the rights identified in Lawrence, the government must
advance an important governmental interest, the intrusion must
significantly further that interest, and the intrusion must be necessary to
further that interest[,]” with no less intrusive alternative.174 The court
found that the government advanced an important interest, namely
management of the military, which requires deference to Congress under
its Article I powers to “raise and support [an] arm[y].”175 Most
importantly, however, the Ninth Circuit said, “[n]otably, ‘deference does
not mean abdication.’”176 Here, the court is referring to the fact that
Congress, even when regulating the military, is still subject to the
requirements of due process.177 The court did not discuss the second or
third criteria because it found the record lacking and would remand the
case to determine if the government met the latter two criteria.178
After making the above findings, the Ninth Circuit held that
heightened scrutiny analysis is only for an as-applied constitutional
challenge to DADT and not facial challenges.179 The court made this
determination to “avoid making unnecessarily broad constitutional
judgments.”180 Thus, the court remanded the case to develop the record,
and determine whether less intrusive means than DADT would “achieve
substantially the government’s interest.”181 The court also noted that the
“Air Force attempts to justify [DADT] by relying on congressional
findings regarding ‘unit cohesion’ and the like, but that does not go to
173

Id. at 818–19 (quoting Sell, 539 U.S. at 180–81) (emphasis in original) (The Sell
test is comprised of three relevant factors: “First, a court must find that important
governmental interests are at stake . . . . Courts, however, must consider the facts of the
individual case in evaluating the Government’s interest . . . . Special circumstances may
lessen the importance of that interest . . . . Second, the court must conclude that [the
policy] will significantly further those concomitant state interests . . . . Third, the court
must conclude that [the policy] is necessary to further those interests. The court must
find that any alternative, less intrusive [policies] are unlikely to achieve substantially the
same results . . . .”).
174
Id. at 819.
175
Id. at 821.
176
Id. (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981)).
177
Witt, 527 F.3d at 821 (citing Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 176 (1994)).
178
Id. at 821.
179
Id. at 819.
180
Id. at 819 (quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 447
(1985) (internal citations omitted)).
181
Id. at 821.
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whether the application of DADT specifically to Major Witt significantly
furthers the government’s interest . . . .”182 This final pronouncement is
one of the most significant conclusions of the decision because the court
questioned the government’s reliance on congressional findings as a
justification for the policy. Specifically, the court questioned whether
the policy of DADT furthered the purported interest of unit cohesion,
etc.183 By questioning Congress’s findings, the court was pitting the
constitutional protections of due process against the Article I power of
Congress to regulate the military.
After the Ninth Circuit issued its decision, the government filed a
petition for hearing en banc, which the en banc panel denied.184 Judge
O’Scannlain, joined by Judges M. Smith and Bea, dissented from the
denial of rehearing en banc.185
In his scathing dissent, Judge
O’Scannlain noted the following: the creation of a circuit split by the
panel,186 the failure of the panel to even consider whether Lawrence was
controlling in the matter,187 the authority of the Supreme Court alone to
carve out rights receiving intermediate level scrutiny,188 and the
deference that should be given to Congress in making such important
policy choices as DADT.189 This dissent, like the First Circuit’s opinion
in Cook, argued that Congress was well within its constitutional powers
in regulating the military, and that Congress’s decision should not lightly
be disturbed.190 Judge Kleinfeld, a second dissenter from the denial of
rehearing en banc, concurred in Judge O’Scannlain’s reasoning, but
called for even greater deference to the president and Congress in
regulating the military.191 Both of these arguments for deference would
effectively negate heightened scrutiny because deference means any
interest put forth by the Congress is sufficient to uphold the law.
182

Id.
In the Congressional hearings for DADT, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf made
the following statement: “In my years of military service, I have experienced the fact that
the introduction of an open homosexual into a small unit immediately polarizes that unit
and destroys the very bonding that is so important for the unit’s survival in time of war.”
S. Rep. No. 103–112, at 280 (1994). General Colin Powell also made a similar
statement, that open homosexuality in units “involves matters of privacy and human
sexuality that, in our judgment, if allowed to exist openly in the military, would affect the
cohesion and well-being of the force.” Id. at 281.
184
Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 548 F.3d 1264, 1265 (9th Cir. 2008) (O’Scannlain,
J., dissenting).
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Id. at 1267.
188
Id. at 1273.
189
Id. at 1275–76.
190
Witt, 548 F.3d at 1275–76 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting).
191
Id. at 1276–77 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
183
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Chief Judge Kozinski, also writing in dissent from the denial of
rehearing en banc, wrote,
When we stand against the combined might of the other branches
of government, we should ensure that our own authority is at its
maximum. En banc rehearing—whatever the outcome—would
have shown that we gave this matter the sustained attention it
merits. Moreover, there is strength in numbers: The conclusions
of an en banc court would reflect many more points of view and
could not easily be dismissed as outliers.192

This passage expounds several important points. First, Chief Judge
Kozinski noted that ruling against DADT pits the judiciary against the
other two branches of government.193 Second, the only means by which
the court of appeals can give its reasoning maximum authority is through
en banc review, in which an eleven-judge panel, and not just a threejudge panel, decides the merits of the case.194 Finally, and most
importantly, Chief Judge Kozinski noted that any conclusion reached by
an en banc court can hardly be dismissed as an outlying decision, having
received the utmost attention of the entire court of appeals.195 This point
is crucial if the Witt decision is setting the stage for a constitutional
challenge in front of the Supreme Court, which would pay greater
deference to a decision reached by an en banc court of appeals than just a
three judge panel. As Chief Judge Kozinski indicated, “Major Witt’s
case compellingly illustrates the sometimes arbitrary and destructive
operation of the ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ policy.”196 For this very reason,
if nothing else, the Ninth Circuit should have reviewed the case en banc.
After remand, District Court Judge Ronald B. Leighton determined
that as applied to Major Witt, DADT was not constitutional.197 The
court’s narrow inquiry, as directed by the Ninth Circuit, was “whether
192

Id. at 1280 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
Id.
194
In other circuits, en banc typically means that all the circuit judges sit and decide
the case. FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS 108
(Stanford University Press, 1st ed. 2007). Yet, because the Ninth Circuit is so large, the
panel usually only seats eleven judges, pursuant to PUB. L. NO. 95–486 (stating that for
circuit courts with more than 15 judges, an en banc hearing may consist of “such number
of members of its en banc courts as may be prescribed by rule of the court of appeals..”).
See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 85 F.3d 1440 (9th Cir. 1996); Campbell v.
Wood, 20 F.3d 1050, 1051 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Penn, 647 F.2d 876 (9th Cir.
1980). The Fifth Circuit, with 17 judges, could adopt a similar procedure, but has only
done so once in Louisiana v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc).
195
Witt, 548 F.3d at 1280 (Kozinski, J. dissenting).
196
Id.
197
Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, No. 06-5195RBL, mem. op. at 13 (W.D. Wash.
Sept. 24, 2010).
193

182

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 7:155

the specific application of DADT to Major Witt significantly furthers the
government’s interest, and whether less intrusive means would
substantially achieve the government’s interest.”198 The government’s
purpose in promulgating DADT, as evidenced in the Congressional
findings of the statute, was to promote high unit morale, good order, and
unit cohesion.199 The court noted that the only evidence that Major
Witt’s reinstatement would adversely affect unit morale or cohesion was
contained in surveys and polls that indicated that some “persons in the
446th AES who would prefer that gays and lesbians not serve openly
within their unit but such preferences are not outcome determinative
here.”200 The fact that some servicemembers may dislike serving
alongside gays and lesbians “is off-set by the known negative impact of
DADT upon the military: the loss of highly skilled and trained military
personnel once they have been outed and the concomitant assault on unit
morale and cohesion caused by their extraction from the military.”201
After determining that dismissal from service was not the least intrusive
means to achieve the government’s interest, the final order of the court
was that Major Witt “should be reinstated at the earliest possible
moment.”202
3. Cook v. Gates, First Circuit
Although the First Circuit in Cook v. Gates203 agreed with much of
the reasoning set forth in Witt, it departed from the Ninth Circuit in
certain respects. The First Circuit declined to apply the three-factor
intermediate scrutiny test and the required deference to Congress,204
creating a split with the Ninth Circuit on these issues. The First Circuit,
however, agreed with the Ninth Circuit that heightened scrutiny should
apply to cases implicating the interests developed in Lawrence, and thus
the First Circuit joined the Ninth Circuit in its split with the Eleventh
Circuit on this point.205
The First Circuit noted that there are many courts that have read
Lawrence to require only rational basis review206 while others have
198

Id. at 2 (citing Witt, 527 F.3d at 821).
Id. at 5 (citing 10 U.S.C. §§ 654(a)(14-15) (2006)).
200
Id. at 12.
201
Id.
202
Id.
203
528 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008).
204
Id.
205
Id. at 56.
206
See, e.g., Sylvester v. Fogley, 465 F.3d 851, 858 (8th Cir. 2006); Muth v. Frank,
412 F.3d 808, 818 (7th Cir. 2005); Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1238
(11th Cir. 2004); Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Childr & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804
199
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viewed Lawrence as requiring strict scrutiny.207 Finally, a third, smaller
group of courts have viewed Lawrence as requiring some other form of
scrutiny that rests between strict scrutiny and rational basis.208 The First
Circuit falls within the ambit of the third category, recognizing that
Lawrence protected a liberty interest and applied a balancing test which
sets the review standard somewhere between strict scrutiny and rational
basis.209
The court found four reasons why Lawrence can be read as
protecting a liberty interest. First, the court noted that the Lawrence
court relied upon fundamental rights cases in its analysis.210 These
fundamental rights cases placed the liberty interest in Lawrence with the
constitutional zone of privacy. Second, the language of the Court in
Lawrence revolved around notions of freedom and liberty, extending this
notion of liberty to adult, consensual sexual activity.211 Third, the Court
overruled Bowers and held the Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion in
Bowers should now be controlling.212 Finally, if Lawrence had applied
mere rational basis review, the Supreme Court would have sustained the
Texas criminal law and not overturned it.213
The court refuted the three main reasons other courts have held that
Lawrence review was merely rational basis review. First, even though
(11th Cir. 2004); Witt v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, 444 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1143 (W.D.
Wash. 2006), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, remanded to 527 F.3d 806 (2008), rehearing en
banc denied 548 F.3d 1264 (2008); United States v. Extreme Assocs., Inc., 352 F. Supp.
2d 578, 591 (W.D. Pa. 2005); Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 219, 310 (2007); State v.
Lowe, 861 N.E.2d 512, 517 (Ohio 2007); State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22, 29 (Kan. 2005);
Ex parte Morales, 212 S.W.3d 483, 493 (Tex. App. 2006); Martin v. Ziherl, 269 Va. 35,
42 (2005); State v. Clinkenbeard, 123 P.3d 872, 878 (Wash. App. 2005).
207
See, e.g., Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d at 1252 (11th Cir. 2004)
(Barkett, J., dissenting); Doe v. Miller, 298 F. Supp. 2d 844, 871 (S.D. Iowa 2004), rev’d
on other grounds, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005); Hudson Valley Black Press v. IRS, 307
F. Supp. 2d 543, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 271 F. Supp. 2d
1217, 1221 (C.D. Cal. 2003). See also Donald H. J. Hermann, Pulling the Fig Leaf Off
the Right of Privacy: Sex and the Constitution, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 909, 969 (2005);
Tribe, supra note 15, at 1917.
208
See, e.g., Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198 (C.A.A.F. 2004). See also, Donald L. Beschle, Lawrence
Beyond Gay Rights: Taking the Rationality Requirement for Justifying Criminal Statutes
Seriously, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 231, 276 (2005); John G. Culhane, Writing on, Around and
Through Lawrence v. Texas, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 493 (2005); Nancy C. Marcus,
Beyond Romer and Lawrence: The Right to Privacy Comes out of the Closet, 15 COLUM.
J. GENDER & L. 355 (2006); Jerald A. Sharum, Comment, Controlling Conduct: The
Emerging Protection of Sodomy in the Military, 69 ALB. L. REV. 1195, 1202 (2006).
209
Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 56 (1st Cir. 2008).
210
Id. at 52.
211
Id.
212
Id.
213
Id.
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Lawrence did not call the right “fundamental,” several other Supreme
Court cases214 all described the substantive due process rights in terms of
either “liberty interests” or “protected liberty,” and not as
“fundamental.”215 Second, the court stated that the argument that
Lawrence did not rely on an analysis of the nation’s history and tradition
is “based on the mistaken premise that the only history relevant to the
substantive due process inquiry is a history demonstrating affirmative
government action to protect the right in question.”216 The court argued
that Lawrence’s thorough historical analysis is consistent with Supreme
Court precedent in the area.217 Third, the argument that because the
majority did not respond to Justice Scalia’s assertion that the Court had
failed to recognize a protected liberty interest, thereby affirming that
assertion, is but one possible explanation for the majority’s silence. The
majority may have been relying on the fact that the opinion stood for
itself, “and that there was little to be gained by debating Justice Scalia on
this point.”218
The First Circuit held that Lawrence is “another in this line of
Supreme Court authority that identifies a protected liberty interest and
then applies a standard of review that lies between strict scrutiny and
rational basis.”219 Lawrence, as the First Circuit saw it, “balanced the
strength of the state’s asserted interest in prohibiting immoral conduct
against the degree of intrusion into the petitioners’ private sexual
life . . . .”220 The court held that even under heightened scrutiny, a facial
challenge to DADT must fail because facial challenges are the most
demanding constitutional challenges, the Lawrence court was explicit in
limiting the liberty interest, noting that it does not protect all forms of
sexual intimacy, the court found that a facial challenge to DADT must
fail.221
The court then turned its analysis to an as-applied challenge to the
law under the due process clause. The court found that the government’s
asserted interests were significant enough to overcome the intrusion on
the protected liberty interest because of the force of judicial deference to
214
Cruzan v. Dir. of Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990); Washington v.
Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 223 (1990); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982);
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979).
215
Cook, 528 F.3d at 53 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 851; Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278;
Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315).
216
Id.
217
Id. (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 132–41).
218
Id. at 54.
219
Id. at 56.
220
Id.
221
Cook, 528 F.3d at 56.
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Congress when regulating the military as applied.222 The court indicated
two primary reasons for such deference. First, institutional competence,
as Congress is best equipped, through its committee hearing and
informational gathering processes, to determine what policies best serve
the armed forces.223 Second, constitutional power, as Congress, under
Article I, is the branch of government expressly granted the power and
authority to “raise and support armies” as well as “make all laws
necessary and proper to that end.”224 The court held that “where
Congress has articulated a substantial government interest for a law, and
where the challenges in question implicate that interest, judicial intrusion
is simply not warranted.”225 Due to these reasons, as-applied challenges
to DADT must also fail.226
The court’s final point on as-applied challenges was that
Congress’s interest is substantial, and judicial deference prevents judicial
overstep.227 This point breaks with the decision in Witt, forming the
second point of departure from the Ninth Circuit in the three-way circuit
split. This reasoning is also suspect following the line of military court
cases that do not rely on such deference.228 Finally, now that DADT is
being repealed and Congress’s interest has changed, there likely would
have been a different outcome in Cook.
III. THE MORALITY OF “DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL” AND ITS
SIGNIFICANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF LAWRENCE, LOFTON,
WITT, AND COOK
The morality of DADT is not important per se, but it is important in
order to resolve its classification as a purely moral-based law or as
composite or embedded. The Supreme Court’s taxonomy regarding
morality-based legislation, which defines each category of moralitybased laws, is useful because it allows us to fit the decision in Lawrence
together with the standard of scrutiny applied in Witt and Cook to
determine whether DADT would pass constitutional muster.229 If DADT
is purely moral-based, a law justified only by morality, then there is no
reason to even apply Witt and Cook’s heightened review.230 If the law is
222

Id. at 57.
Id.
224
Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
377 (1968)).
225
Id. at 60.
226
Id.at 60.
227
Cook, 528 F.3d at 60.
228
See United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198 (C.A.A.F. 2004)
229
Goldberg, supra note 2, at 1244.
230
Id.
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morally embedded or composite, wherein morality is an implicit or
explicit judgment in the law, then a successful challenge would require
heightened review.231 This framework could also, at least theoretically,
apply to other laws beyond DADT like UCMJ Article 125.
The three-way circuit split between Lofton, Witt, and Cook poses
three distinct challenges to future courts considering the application of
Lawrence to DADT or other morality-based legislation. First, if we
presume DADT is based on morality alone, it would fail the lowest
standard of review, rational basis review. The Court in Lawrence
explicitly stated that Justice Stevens’s dissent in Bowers would be
controlling, where he stated that morality is not enough to uphold a
law.232 Second, there are viable arguments that DADT has practical or
utilitarian objectives in addition to morality, which means that the only
way to challenge the policy, or one like it, would be under heightened
review. Witt and Cook both determined that Lawrence requires
heightened review.233 Under intermediate scrutiny, as articulated under
the Witt court’s test, DADT would again fail.234 The Cook court’s
deference to Congress was erroneous because such deference negates
intermediate scrutiny, which the court held was necessary following
Lawrence, and even military courts do not grant such unquestioning
deference to Congress.235 Finally, Lofton should be accorded less weight
in determining the standard of review required by Lawrence because the
Eleventh Circuit expressly determined that Lawrence was not controlling
in that case.236
A. “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” as a Purely Moral-Based Law
If we begin with the presumption that DADT is strictly moralbased, that is, a purely moral law, then the only justification for the law
is that it represents the moral edict of the governing majority. If the
Court truly intended in Lawrence to make Justice Stevens’s Bowers
dissent controlling, then DADT fails rational basis review. In his dissent,
Justice Stevens states that morality is not a sufficient basis on which to
uphold a law.237 If morality is not enough, then a law based solely on
231
232
233

at 56.
234

Id.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 818 (9th Cir. 2008); Cook, 528 F.3d

Witt, 527 F.3d at 818-20.
Cook, 528 F.3d at 57-59.
236
Lofton, 358 F.3d at 817.
237
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“the fact that the governing
majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a
sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice . . . .”).
235
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morality does not have a legitimate or rational basis, which is a necessary
component for the law to be upheld. Morality, then, should not serve as
a legitimate sole basis for any legislation, not just DADT.
B. “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” as a Morally Composite or Embedded Law
The next two questions after determining that DADT or another law
would fail rational basis review if it is based on morality alone are: 1) Is
the law based on something more than pure morality?; and 2) If the law
has utilitarian or practical policy goals beyond morality, can it still be
successfully challenged under substantive due process? If the law does
have a basis beyond pure morality, then the only method of a successful
challenge would be through heightened review. Thus, the analysis turns
on whether the law is pure moral legislation or not.
1. Is DADT Morally Composite or Embedded?
The first place to look to determine whether DADT is a composite
or embedded law is in the policy and the Congressional deliberations. In
a Senate Report from the Armed Forces Committee, the Congressional
record shows that Congress contemplated the implications of DADT on
the constitutional rights of homosexuals.238 The report concluded that
even “if the Supreme Court should reverse its ruling in Bowers and hold
that private consensual homosexual acts between adults may not be
prosecuted in civilian society, this would not alter the committee’s
judgment as to the effect of homosexual conduct in the armed forces.”239
This finding is important because it indicates that even if the Supreme
Court found that consensual sexual relations between homosexuals were
protected by the Constitution, Congress would still find that those
committing homosexual sexual acts in the military must be separated.
For this assertion to be sustainable, it must mean that DADT is based on
something more than pure morality.
Another place to look for possible utilitarian justifications are the
Congressional findings articulated in the law, the most important of
which are found in subsections 13 and 15 of 10 U.S.C. § 654(a). In
subsection 13, Congress finds that “[t]he prohibition against homosexual
conduct is a longstanding element of military law that continues to be
necessary in the unique circumstances of military service.”240 The
phrasing of this subsection leaves no doubt that Congress is alluding to a
longer tradition of criminalizing homosexual conduct, in the military as
238
239
240

S. Rep. No. 103–112, at 287 (1993); H.R. Rep. No. 103–200, at 286 (1993).
Id.
10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(13) (2006).
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well as in the civilian world, directly following the reasoning of
Bowers.241 The use of the phrase “unique conditions of military
service,”242 however, indicates that there is at least something about
service in the armed forces that warrants this regulation. This finding
likely reflects a practical goal served by the law.
In subsection 15, Congress finds that “[t]he presence in the armed
forces of persons who demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in
homosexual acts would create an unacceptable risk to the high standards
of morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the
essence of military capability.”243 This subsection expressly establishes
Congress’s utilitarian justification for the policy that was hinted at in
subsection 13, which is the belief that homosexuality is a risk to morale,
good discipline, and unit cohesion. This justification demonstrates a
clearly composite morality basis for the law; it states as its purpose the
protection of morale, discipline, and unit cohesion, which are all
practical utilitarian goals, yet the law also makes a moral judgment
regarding homosexuality as something inconsistent with the military.
The moral judgment that open homosexuality is subversive, as well as
the military’s general regulation of sexual conduct between
servicemembers, demonstrate that DADT is based on something more
than pure morality.
The policy aspect of DADT is designed to establish criteria for
when members of the armed forces are to be separated from the military,
following regulations to be issued by the Secretary of Defense.244 Under
the policy provisions of the statute, there are three different reasons for
which servicemembers can be separated from the military.245 It is
important to note that there is also an excuse for homosexual conduct
contained within the policy.246 This listed excuse is important because

241

Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192 (noting that laws limiting homosexual rights have ancient

roots).
242

10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(8)(A) (2006).
Id. at § 654(a)(15).
Id. at § 654(b).
245
Id. (“(1) That the member has engaged in, attempted to engage in, or solicited
another to engage in a homosexual act or acts . . . . (2) That the member has stated that
he or she is a homosexual or bisexual, or words to that effect . . . . (3) That the member
has married or attempted to marry a person known to be of the same biological sex.”).
246
To be excused, the servicemember must prove that: “(A) such conduct is a
departure from the member’s usual and customary behavior; (B) such conduct, under all
the circumstances, is unlikely to recur; (C) such conduct was not accomplished by use of
force, coercion, or intimidation; (D) under the particular circumstances of the case, the
member’s continued presence in the armed forces is consistent with the interests of the
armed forces in proper discipline, good order, and morale; and (E) the member does not
have a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts.”)
10 U.S.C.
243
244
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the criteria present justifications for otherwise “unlawful” conduct, but
dissecting each and noting their combination of moral judgments and
utilitarian elements, another purpose of the law becomes more apparent:
preventing repeat sexual activity in the military, particularly of the
homosexual variety.
The first criterion, that the conduct was outside customary
behavior,247 depicts Congress’s reluctance to define homosexuality in
terms of a single act. This is interesting considering the nature of the
policy and the specific “risks” it seeks to prevent. Although Congress
claimed in DADT that all homosexual acts are a risk to morale, good
discipline, and unit cohesion, it seems odd that a one-time act of
indiscretion poses less of a risk, exonerating the servicemember. This
excuse provision is in stark contrast to UCMJ Article 125, which does
not contain such an excuse.248 The excuse provision in DADT exposes a
utilitarian goal of the law, to punish repeat conduct and not just one-time
offenses. Congress, it would seem, recognizes that sexual activity will
occur in the military, but so long as it only happens once and presumably
within the bounds of Article 125, it is forgiven under the statute. Yet if
the person happens to be an acknowledged homosexual, he or she is
separated from the military due to his or her propensity to commit a
repeat act. The utilitarian goal is therefore the prevention of repeated
sexual acts that cause disruption, and the moral judgment is that
homosexual conduct has a greater propensity to cause disruption than
heterosexual conduct.
The second criterion, that the conduct is unlikely to recur,249 is a
mirror image of the first excuse, and therefore warrants limited
discussion. It is unlikely that anyone who successfully proves the first
criterion could not also prove the second. The presumption in this
criterion is that if one is a “practicing” homosexual, homosexual acts will
recur.250
§§ 654(b)(1)(A)–(E) (2006). Under 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1) there is a list of five criteria,
and if all five are satisfied, the homosexual act or acts can be excused. Id.
247
10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1)(A) (2006).
248
Id. at § 925.
249
Id. at § 654(b)(1)(B).
250
DOD Directive 1332.40 § E2.3.1.2 (1997) (“In considering whether a member has
rebutted this presumption [that he or she is unlikely to engage in homosexual acts], the
military considers: (1) whether the member has engaged in a homosexual act; (2) the
member’s credibility; (3) testimony from others about the member’s past conduct; (4) the
nature and circumstances of the member’s statement; and (5) any other evidence relevant
to whether the member is likely to engage in a homosexual act.”). As is evident reading
the directive, the primary factor the military considers to determine if one is likely to
engage in a future homosexual act is whether someone has done so in the past. The only
case, so far, that has considered these “retention” criteria was Kindred v. United States,
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The third criterion fits within the ambit of other sexually regulated
conduct such as rape. If the servicemember’s homosexual act was
accomplished through use of force or coercion,251 just like forcible
intercourse in civilian life, courts should not exonerate that behavior just
because it is unlikely to recur or because it was outside normal behavior.
In turn, that member’s separation from the armed forces is both
reasonable and justified. Because there is an injury to another, which the
Court decried in Lawrence, the State has a greater interest in regulating
such conduct than the individual does in exercising his or her liberty
interest.
The fourth criterion, that “the member’s continued presence in the
armed forces is consistent with the interests of the armed forces,”252
seems to be the most subjective and utilitarian of the criteria. If the
military has deemed homosexuality and homosexual conduct as risks to
morale, discipline, and unit cohesion, it seems contradictory to determine
that it is in the military’s best interest to retain someone who committed
such an act. This provision, as it reads, seems to suggest that the military
is willing to overlook the indiscretion of some soldiers and not others,
based merely on the military’s needs and the servicemember-inquestion’s ability to satisfy those needs overrides the moral disapproval
of that person’s conduct.
The fifth criterion, delineating “propensity or intent to engage in
homosexual acts,”253 seems primarily aimed at character, which is really
intended to indicate the likelihood of one to engage in the restricted
conduct. This is significant because it is possible that in a separation
proceeding, an open or “practicing” homosexual is most likely to be
found to have a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts, no
matter how celibate he or she might be, just do to his or her openness.
For this reason, this criterion is the least utilitarian, and the one most
embedded with morality.
Another section of DADT relevant to understanding the policy
justifications is 10 U.S.C. § 654(f)(3), which defines “homosexual act.”
Included within this definition is “(A) any bodily contact, actively
undertaken or passively permitted, between members of the same sex for
the purpose of satisfying sexual desires; and (B) any bodily contact
which a reasonable person would understand to demonstrate a propensity
41 Fed. Cl. 106 (1998), where the court reversed a determination of a Naval Court
dismissing Kindred under DADT because the lower court had failed to consider whether
the retention criteria had been met.
251
10 U.S.C § 654(b)(1)(C) (2006).
252
Id. at § 654(b)(1)(D).
253
Id. at § 654(b)(1)(E).
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or intent to engage in an act described in subparagraph (A).”254 The
broad language of this provision makes almost any act between two
persons of the same sex a homosexual act for which they can be
separated from the military. This is particularly interesting when
compared to Uniform Code of Military Justice Article 125, Sodomy,255
which defines sodomy as any “unnatural carnal copulation with another
person of the same or opposite sex or with an animal . . . .”256 If one
compares the two definitions side by side, they demonstrate that
heterosexual and homosexual servicemembers alike are punished for
certain sexual behavior in the military. This presents a common utility of
preventing sexual activity between servicemembers. The difference
between the two policies is that where both laws punish soldiers for their
conduct, homosexuals were, and possibly still are, almost automatically
separated from the military for their conduct under DADT, whereas their
heterosexual counterparts are not under Article 125. Article 125 does not
contain a separation provision like DADT.257 This difference between
the two policies then leads to the conclusion that what is really driving
the policy behind “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” is morality with some
embedded or composite justifications.
Considering DADT in light of morality-based classifications, we
see that DADT relies heavily on embedded and composite justification.
Though the explicit aims of DADT were to prevent the risks that
homosexuality poses to unit cohesion, morale, and good discipline,
inherent in DADT was the moral judgment that homosexuality is
somehow wrong, and this moral judgment therefore becomes a
justification for the policy. If one reads the target of homosexuality as an
explicit moral judgment, then the law would be composite, yet if the law
is read as an implicit moral judgment, it would be a moral-embedded
law. Because DADT contains provisions that could be read either way, it
may be either or both, indicating that some form of heightened review
would be necessary for DADT to be unconstitutional.
2. Marcum Proves that Lawrence’s Liberty Interest Applies to
UCMJ Article 125 Challenges
Article 125, which prohibits sodomy, and is similar to the laws that
Lawrence struck down, is useful to rebut the First Circuit’s argument in
Cook that courts should give significant deference to Congress’s power
to regulate the military and dismiss such cases. First, because Article
254
255
256
257

Id. at § 654(f)(3).
Id. at § 925.
Id.
10 U.S.C. §925.
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125 is a military measure and part of the UCMJ, a parallel to DADT can
easily be drawn in terms of Congress’s power to regulate the military.
Second, the line of cases interpreting military policy regarding sexual
conduct under Article 125 demonstrates the way military courts,
including the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, consider the
application of the policy after Lawrence. If the military courts, with their
close link to the armed services, are willing to deem certain applications
of Article 125 unconstitutional after Lawrence, then there is no clear
reason for granting the deference to Congress under DADT that the First
Circuit argues for in Cook.
Under Article 125, military courts have applied Lawrence primarily
because the conduct prohibited under this article, sodomy, is so closely
associated with the Lawrence decision. United States v. Marcum258 is the
leading case in this discussion. In this case, a servicemember asserted
that his conviction under Article 125 must be set aside following
Lawrence.259 The court began by stating, “Constitutional rights generally
apply to members of the armed forces unless by their express terms, or
the express language of the Constitution, they are inapplicable.”260
Considering the extent of the liberty interest protected in Lawrence, the
court noted that many other courts have grappled with the standard of
review Lawrence requires.261 The court noted that the use of strict
scrutiny would prove dispositive in a facial challenge to Article 125.262
Like the circuit courts in Lofton, Witt, and Cook, the Marcum court said
that because the Supreme Court did not indicate whether the right was
“fundamental,” it refuses to presume the existence of such a right and
apply strict scrutiny.263 The court held that Lawrence requires “searching
constitutional inquiry,” which may require a court to inquire beyond
categorical determinations of whether the interest at issue is within the
interest articulated in Lawrence or whether it is part of the exceptions
listed in Lawrence.264 The court ruled that under this test Marcum’s
conduct was outside the Lawrence liberty interest because the person
with whom Marcum had sexual relations was a person within his chain
258

60 M.J. 198 (C.A.A.F. 2004).
Id. at 200.
260
Id.
261
Id. at 204.
262
Id. This statement by the court seems to indicate two possible reasons Article 125
would not survive strict scrutiny. First, the law may not be narrowly tailored, or in other
words, it is not the least restrictive means. Second, the purpose of the law may not be
compelling. It might not be compelling because it is not necessary, or it might not be
compelling because it is based on a moral judgment and not genuine utility.
263
Id. at 205.
264
Marcum, 60 M.J. at 205.
259
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of command.265 This lent an air of coercion to the relationship, creating a
situation where consent might not easily be refused and therefore
removing the acts from Lawrence’s protection.266 This determination in
Marcum was consistent with the Lawrence court’s determination that the
right does not involve “persons who might be injured or coerced or who
are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be
refused.”267
After establishing this heightened standard of review, the Marcum
court developed a three-question test for future military courts to use
when considering whether the sexual conduct in question is protected by
the liberty interest in Lawrence.268 As the Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces, reviewing decisions from the courts of the various
military branches, this test would become binding precedent as well as
the basis for almost all constitutional challenges to Article 125 after
Lawrence.269
Some courts have found servicemembers’ conduct
protected within Lawrence’s liberty interest,270 but this has not been the
majority of cases.271
What these cases indicate is that courts, even military courts, are
sustaining challenges to military policy and Congressional authority after
Lawrence. On the one hand, military courts have upheld policies like a
Coast Guard policy prohibiting romantic relationships272 and regulations
for the Corps of Cadets.273 On the other hand, they have also held that
“the government cannot claim a heightened interest in controlling the
specific sexual acts between [servicemembers] merely because those acts

265

Id. at 208.
Id.
267
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
268
Marcum, 60 M.J. at 206–07 (internal citations omitted) (“First, was the conduct
that the accused was found guilty of committing of a nature to bring it within the liberty
interest identified by the Supreme Court? Second, did the conduct encompass any
behavior or factors identified by the Supreme Court as outside the analysis in Lawrence?
Third, are there additional factors relevant solely in the military environment that affect
the nature and reach of the Lawrence liberty interest?”).
269
See, e.g., United States v. Stirewalt, 60 M.J. 297 (C.A.A.F. 2004); United States v.
Smith, 66 M.J. 556 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 2008); United States v. Humphreys, 2005 CCA
LEXIS 401 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2005).
270
Humphreys, 2005 CCA LEXIS 401 at *11; United States v. Barber, 2004 CCA
LEXIS 391, *22–23 (Army Ct. Crim. App. Oct. 7, 2004).
271
Smith, 66 M.J. at 561; Stirewalt, 60 M.J. at 304.
272
Stirewalt, 60 M.J. at 304 (citing Coast Guard Personnel Manual, para. 8.H.2.f.
(1988) (Unacceptable Romantic Relationships)).
273
Smith, 66 M.J. at 561 (citing Regulations for the Corps of Cadets, Article 4–5–05
entitled Sexual Misconduct). The Corps of Cadets in this case refers to the U.S. Coast
Guard Academy Corps of Cadets, which is the student body of the academy. The
regulations cited are those by which cadets must live while at the academy.
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took place in a barracks room”274 and the fact that court-martialing a
soldier may decrease his unit’s morale is an insufficient basis for
dismissing him.275 These cases indicate that even military courts are
prepared to question Congress like the court did in Witt; however, it
remains unclear whether “unit cohesion” would satisfy the Sell test as a
constitutionally valid justification for DADT. It is also dubious whether
separation from the military significantly furthers the government’s
interest in unit cohesion or “whether less intrusive means would achieve
substantially the government’s interest.”276 If unit cohesion was really
the reason for DADT, then how does separating a decorated officer, like
Major Witt, improve unit cohesion? The First Circuit should have
followed the military courts’ questioning of Congress’s justification
rather than relying on legislative deference.
Another important fact to consider when contemplating Article 125
is that the seminal decision in Marcum was decided in 2004, before
either Witt or Cook were decided. The significance of the timing of these
cases is that Marcum’s three-prong test interpreting the liberty interest in
Lawrence is still binding precedent on any of the lower military courts.
Because Marcum was decided before Witt and Cook, the Marcum court
did not have the benefit of the persuasive reasoning of the Ninth or First
Circuits’ decisions.
The pertinent question is whether the same heightened scrutiny that
applied in Witt and Cook could be applied in the Article 125 context.
The Marcum court explicitly stated that strict scrutiny would prove
dispositive in a facial challenge to Article 125, but did not hold that such
a standard applied.277 Instead, the court found that Lawrence required a
searching constitutional inquiry, which is not language typical of mere
rational basis review.278 This vagueness might mean that the standard of
heightened scrutiny that both the Witt and Cook courts call for would
also prove dispositive in a challenge to Article 125, particularly in light
of the Sell test adopted by the court in Witt. Also, the fact that Marcum
is binding on military courts does not mean that it is binding on other
courts, particularly federal district courts, where a case challenging the
validity of Article 125 could be brought. This means that even though
274

Humphreys, 2005 CCA LEXIS 401 at *7.
Id. at *10.
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Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 821 (9th Cir. 2008). See also Major
Joel P. Cummings, Is Article 125, Sodomy a Dead Letter in Light of Lawrence v. Texas
and the New Article 120?, 2009 ARMY L. 1 (2009); Jerald A. Sharum, Comment,
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DADT has been repealed by Congress, though enforcement of the repeal
is still unclear, the line of reasoning from Lawrence to Witt to Cook
would still be relevant in the context of Congress’s regulation of private,
consensual sexual acts that occur in the military between
servicemembers or between a servicemember and civilian through the
operation of the UCMJ Article 125. Witt and Cook, following Lawrence,
are useful as a basis for challenging the constitutionality of other acts of
Congress regulating the military in addition their direct applicability to
DADT.
3. “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Would Fail Heightened Review under
Witt
Because Cook’s deference can be discounted following Marcum
and its progeny, and because it seems clear that DADT has at least some
utilitarian policy justifications, it is still possible that DADT could have
been constitutional. For that reason, it is necessary to consider how
DADT would have fared under heightened review. Although both Cook
and Witt found that Lawrence required more than just rational basis
review, only Witt provided a clear test for the intermediate scrutiny it
found applicable. The dispositive element of this test for DADT is that
there must be no “alternative, less intrusive [policy likely] to achieve
substantially the same results . . . .”279
Applying this standard of review to DADT demonstrates that
DADT would again fail to pass constitutional muster. There are likely
hundreds of less intrusive alternatives to DADT’s separation procedures
that achieve the government’s objectives as articulated in the
Congressional findings, the most obvious of which is Article 125. Once
DADT is fully repealed, the sexual conduct DADT sought to prevent
would be prevented under Article 125 by punishing homosexuals in the
same way it punishes heterosexuals. This means that DADT, even with
composite or embedded justifications, still fails under heightened review,
which Witt and Cook both called for. This, however, leaves doubt as to
whether Article 125 is still constitutional, or whether the military will
recommend changes to Article 125 now that DADT has been repealed.280
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Witt, 527 F.3d at 819 (quoting Sell, 539 U.S. at 180–81).
S. 4023, 111th Cong. § 2(a)(2)(D) (2010) (noting that the Secretary of Defense
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IV. CONCLUSION
When Lawrence was decided, it “offered a possibility wherein the
moral views of the majority could not control the sexual lives of
individuals.”281 Lawrence created the promise of a more potent liberty
interest that could defend the gay community against the animus and
stigma of the moral majority while promoting individual autonomy and
the dignity our Constitution guarantees.282 Because Bowers was the only
contemporary Supreme Court case that sustained a law on morality
rationale alone,283 it makes sense that the Court overruled it in Lawrence.
Lawrence offered a path towards full acceptance of homosexuality in
society.
Although full acceptance has yet to manifest itself, social trends are
moving away from the “second class” status attributed to
homosexuals.284 In recent months, two cases decided in federal court in
Massachusetts determined that the Defense of Marriage Act, commonly
referred to as DOMA, is unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment,285
as well as the Tenth Amendment and the Spending Clause.286 In
addition, a federal district court judge in California ruled in August 2010
that a constitutional amendment to the California state constitution that
made same-sex marriages illegal was a violation of the Equal Protection
and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.287 And relevant
281
Jonathan M. Black, Tenth Annual Review of Gender and Sexuality Law,
Constitutional Chapter: Sexual Privacy After Lawrence v. Texas, 10 GEO. J. GENDER &
L. 297, 330 (2009).
282
See generally Marcus supra note 208.
283
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986). Sodomy laws should not be
invalidated because the majority belief that sodomy is immoral is an inadequate rationale
to support such laws. Id.; see also Goldberg supra note 2, at 1284 (discussing the history
of Supreme Court cases relying on morality justifications, and noting that Bowers is the
only case to rely exclusively on morality as its basis).
284
For the first time in American history, more people said they supported same-sex
marriage rights than the number saying they were opposed, 49 percent to 46 percent.
Gary Langer, Changing Views on Gay Marriage, Gun Control, Immigration and
Legalizing Marijuana, ABC NEWS April 30, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/PollingUnit/
Obama100days/story?id=7459488&page=1&page=1.
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Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 397 (D. Mass. 2010) (Judge
Joseph Tauro found that “irrational prejudice never constitutes a legitimate government
interest,” and for that reason, he ruled that DOMA “violates the equal protection
principles embodied in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”)
(emphasis in original).
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Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 698 F. Supp 2d 234, 253
(D. Mass. 2010) (Judge Tauro, who decided the sister case in Gill, determined that
DOMA also violates the Tenth Amendment to the constitution as well as the spending
clause).
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Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. C09-2292VRW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78817, at
*217 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2010).
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to the discussion herein, a federal district court judge in California ruled
that Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell violates the First and Fifth Amendments, and
issued a permanent injunction barring its applicability, which was
ultimately stayed by the Ninth Circuit.288 Most importantly, Congress
acted to repeal DADT,289 and President Obama signed the bill into
law.290
Cases like Witt and Cook, which raise the Constitutional bar for
laws that have no basis other than moral judgment against
homosexuality, prove that there is hope for complete and genuine
equality.291 In the wake of Romer, Lawrence, and Witt, it might be more
difficult to defend laws that restrict homosexual rights, whether
concerning service in the military or the recognition of marriage equality
for LGBT persons. These cases, which may be the basis of a future
Supreme Court challenge, provide a framework that creates some
optimism about protection of LGBT rights.
If the Court truly meant what it said in Lawrence and what it did
when it overruled Bowers and made Justice Stevens’s dissent controlling,
then the following points can be deduced. First, absent injury to another
or an institution the law protects, the state should not regulate a person’s
exercise of liberty.292 Second, that liberty interest is further bolstered
when it takes place within the home.293 Finally, and most significantly,
morality is an insufficient basis on which to uphold a law.294
The application of these principles to the failed policy known as
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” is as follows: if DADT was based on morality
alone, then the law would fail under rational basis review because the
government’s interest is not legitimate. If DADT was a composite or
moral-embedded law, then only heightened scrutiny could overcome and
enable the Court to strike the law down. Fortunately, as we have seen,
288
Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, No. CV 04-08425-VAP, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 93612, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2010), rev’d, No. 10-56634, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22655 (9th Cir. Nov. 1, 2010). The First Amendment claim in this case was
unique in that the law was challenged on the fact that gay and lesbian servicemembers
cannot tell anyone about their sexuality in their profession, which the court ruled was an
unconstitutional infringement of their right to free speech. Id.
289
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290
Gell, supra note 34.
291
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Witt and Cook provide us with a model for an analysis using heightened
review, extracted from the Court’s own decision in Lawrence. Cook’s
deference is questionable following Marcum and its progeny, and Lofton
can be discounted because the Eleventh Circuit explicitly says that
Lawrence was not controlling in that case,295 making its discussion of
Lawrence obiter dictum.
Of the courts to address DADT after Lawrence, only the Witt court
succeeded in understanding and appreciating the full liberty interest at
stake in Lawrence and applying it to the case at bar. The First Circuit
was mistaken in its unequivocal grant of deference to Congress. It failed
to acknowledge the practical implications such deference would have on
the holding that heightened scrutiny must apply. If courts give deference
to Congress’s determinations like the court did in Cook, there is no point
in applying heightened scrutiny because any interest Congress asserts is
sufficient to uphold the law, meaning that challenges will unequivocally
fail. Only the Ninth Circuit in Witt correctly applied heightened scrutiny
to its logical conclusion by not abdicating its decision to Congress by
upholding the Fourteenth Amendment.
DADT was abandoned because it was a failed policy, with
numerous servicemembers attesting to its failures. Yet the current
interim period leaves servicemembers in doubt as to the applicability of
the law and the status of their rights while DADT is still in effect.296
This case law provides them a constitutional claim against any
application of DADT as well as a claim against any past application of
DADT that prevents someone from reenlisting in the armed forces.
Regardless of whether DADT’s basis was morality or morality plus, Witt
provides a framework and a standard of review that any court could
follow to strike down the law. And Witt does not even consider the
moral duty we owe to our national security or the moral duty we owe to
the men and women who choose to serve to protect us all. If the
Supreme Court truly wanted to take a stand and show how far it has
come in its understanding of the human condition, it should hold that
LGBT individuals are a protected class, and any laws curtailing LGBT
rights must be considered under the most searching constitutional
scrutiny—strict scrutiny. Now that Congress has acted to repeal DADT,
it is time for the Court to do something about the ongoing discrimination

295
Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Childr And Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 817 (11th
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cases.”).
296
Scarborough, supra note 61.

2010]

THE MORALITY OF “DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL”

199

against homosexuals by deeming them a protected class under the
constitution.

